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MISSION POSSIBLE: A PARADIGM FOR
ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTUAL
IMPOSSIBILITY AT REGENT UNIVERSITY
C. SCOTT PRYOR*
INTRODUCTION
The ways in which the members of the Association of the
Religiously Affiliated Law Schools (ARALS)1 seek to fulfill their
missions will be as varied as the missions themselves. 2 Within
each of these institutions there will likely be at least several
approaches by which its mission can be fufilled. And within
* Associate Professor, Regent University School of Law. J.D., University of
Wisconsin Law School; M.A., Reformed Theological Seminary. I wish to thank Craig
A. Stern for his original insights and Val D. Ricks for his helpful comments on prior
drafts of this article. The final results are, of course, entirely my responsibility.
I The Association of the Religiously Affiliated Law Schools (ARALS) had its
genesis when Marquette Law School hosted the First Conference of Religiously
Affiliated Law Schools in March of 1994. See Steven M. Barkan, The First
Conference of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools: An Overview, 78 MARQ. L. REV.
247 (1995).
2 The following selections from the mission statements of several ARALS
member schools:
[St. John's University] comimit[s itself] to academic excellence and the
pursuit of wisdom which flows from free inquiry, religious values and
human experience. We strive to preserve and enhance an atmosphere in
which scholarly research, imaginative methodology, global awareness, and
an enthusiastic quest for truth serve as the basis of a vital teaching-
learning process and the development of lifelong learning.
About the University (visited Feb. 4, 2001) <http://www.stjohns.edu/
about/mission.html>; The Mission of Pepperdine University (last modified Apr. 2,
1999) <http'//www.pepperdine.edu/misc/mission.htm> ("Pepperdine is a Christian
university committed to the highest standards of academic excellence and Christian
values, where students are strengthened for lives of purpose, service, and
leadership."); Our Mission (visited Feb. 4, 2001) <http://wwv.nd.edu/
%7endlawltextversion/mission.html> ("Notre Dame is a Catholic law school
dedicated to the integration of reason and faith in the study of law and committed to
developing Judeo-Christian principles within systems of jurisprudence."); see also
Barkan, supra note 1, at 250-54 (summarizing presentations at the First
Conference of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools by ten faculty members on their
views of the missions of various religiously affiliated law schools).
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each of these approaches, the particular faith communities and
personal endowments of the individual members of the faculty of
each institution will play a decisive role. While it is not likely
that a single mode can be prescribed for one institution, each
member of the faculty should undertake to define a means by
which the mission of that school can be achieved and then apply
it to the subjects he or she teaches.
The mission statement of the Regent University School of
Law is nothing if not straightforward. The Law School's mission
is to bring to bear the will of our Creator, Almighty God, upon
legal education and the legal process. In particular, this mission
includes:
1. The education and training of students to become excellent
lawyers within the standards of the legal profession.
2. The grounding of students in biblical foundations of law,
legal institutions, and processes of conflict resolution;
recognition of questions of righteousness in the operation of
law; and pursuit of true justice through professional legal
service.
3. The nurturing and encouragement of students to become
mature Christians who exercise the gifts of the Holy Spirit and
display the fruit of the Holy Spirit in their personal and
professional lives.
4. The nurturing and encouragement of other law students,
practicing lawyers, judges, legislators, government officials,
educators, and others to recognize and to seek the biblical
foundations of law, legal institutions, and the processes of
conflict resolution; to recognize questions of righteousness in
the operation of the law; and to pursue true justice through
professional legal service.3
This article will analyze the aspiration of the preamble,
biblical integration, and the second of the four specific elements
of the mission-theologically informed historical development of
the foundations of the law. 4
While its mission statement contains strong imperatives, the
Law School has never prescribed a single means by which the
3 Mission Statement (visited Apr. 9, 2001) <http://www.regent.edu/
acad/schlaw/welcome/mission.html>.
4 This limited focus should not be understood to reflect a de facto prioritization
of the ambitions of the Law School. The other goals reflected in the mission
statement are of equal value but will not be dealt with in this article.
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faculty should implement it. Regent University has its own
broader mission statement.5 As with the Law School, the
University has never dictated a particular pedagogy. The lack of
a unifying model for the integration of faith and learning
concerned the Board of Trustees of the University. Thus, in 1996
the Academic Council6 of the University appointed the Faith and
Learning Integration Committee (FLIC) to develop and
promulgate models by which the distinctively Christian
foundations of the University could be related to the content and
manner of instruction.
Over the course of six months, the FLIC Committee
surveyed the faculty of the University to determine how its
members were implementing its mission. The results of this
effort were collated and eventually published as the FLIC
Typology Report: The Report of the Typology Subcommittee
("FLIC Report"). 7 The nine models of faith integration at the
5 The Vision and Mission Statement of Regent University is:
Regent University is a graduate institution that exists to bring glory to
God the Father and His Son Jesus Christ through the work of the Holy
Spirit. Our mission is to provide an exemplary education, from a biblical
perspective, leading to graduate degrees for aspiring servant-leaders in
pivotal professions, and to be a leading center of Christian thought and
action.
Vision and Mission Statement of Regent University (visited Feb. 4, 2001)
<http'J/vvw.regent.edu/acad/detail.html>. The integrity of Regent University as a
Christian institution of higher learning rests in large part on its adherence to this
Mission Statement and its underlying philosophy in word and deed.
6 The Academic Council exercises overall supervision of the academic affairs of
Regent University. The Academic Council is composed of the provost, academic
deans, dean of the university libraries and information services, director of the law
library, associate deans, the registrar, the director of institutional effectiveness, the
administrative assistant to the provost, and a representative from the Faculty
Senate.
7 See Faith and Learning Integration Committee (TFLIC") Typology Report: The
Report of the Typology Committee: Joseph N. Kickasola, Chairman, Mary Scarlato,
and Cliff Kelly, to the FLIC, Ralph Miller, Chairman (on file with the author). For
an online summary of the FLIC Report, see Regent University's Nine Models of
Faith Integration (visited Feb. 6, 2001) <http://www.regent.edu/
admin/cids/faithmodel.htmi>. The FLIC Report concluded that all of the models of
faith integration at the University fell into one or more of nine categories: (1) the
Student-Directed Focus in which the students do any biblical integration; (2) the
Spontaneous Focus, where biblical integration flows spontaneously from the
instructor's personality and any medium of education; (3) the Devotional Focus-an
approach to substantive integration initiated by the instructor's use of devotional
time before class instruction begins; (4) the Textbook Focus, where integration is
carried out through a Christian textbook or the Bible used as the textbook; (5) the
Christian Professional Focus, where biblical integration is carried out by means of
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University fell into two categories: (1) substantive integration of
biblical teachings with the subject of the class, and (2) character
development of the student. The Regent University Law Review
has already published a summary and application of the
character development category of the FLIC Report to the
curriculum at the Law School.8
This article will not reiterate either the substance of the
FLIC Report or the applications described in the already
published law review article. It will instead focus on two open
issues. Part I will consider the realization of the mission
statement, taking into account the FLIC Report. It concludes
that one of the models described in the FLIC Report-the
Institutes Focus-is particularly appropriate to the common law
subjects in the Law School curriculum, e.g., torts, property, and
contracts, but requires some amplification to take into account
all of the appropriate perspectives on these subjects. 9
Part II will describe the additional refinements as a three-
dimensional paradigm. This paradigm takes into account the
primary authority of biblically generated teachings, while
acknowledging the weight of the Catholic faith tradition as well
as the perspectives of the current community of legal scholars. A
multi-dimensional paradigm represents a balanced way to
realize the goals of the mission statement. The faculty of the
Law School will never achieve its stated mission unless they
take seriously both the explicit assertions of Scripture and use
the additional sources of authority that Scripture validates.
Failure to grapple earnestly with Scripture amounts to a
concession to the claims of modernity to human autonomy.
Reticence to work within the traditions of the Christian church
the instructor's own analysis and writings; (6) the Experiential Focus in which the
students perform spiritual exercises in class; (7) the Lexical Focus, where students
engage in biblical integration through word studies using concordances; (8) the
Institutes Focus in which biblical integration is conceived of as a systematic,
prophetic use of authority, revelation, and crucial principles; and (9) the Moral
Formation Focus, where the primary emphasis in on the cultivation of Christian
virtue in the students. See id.
8 See Mary C. Scarlato & Lynne Marie Kohm, Integrating Religion, Faith, and
Morality in Traditional Law School Courses, 11 REGENT UNIV. L. REV. 49 (1998-
1999). This article emphasizes those models from the FLIC Report dealing with
character formation rather than substantive biblical integration.
9 The paradigm described in this article should also be appropriate to other
legal subjects, but the historically-rooted nature of the common law makes it easier
to relate it to such subjects.
[Vol.74:691
MISSION POSSIBLE
identifies the production of the faculty with personal
subjectivity. And reluctance to come to grips with the manifold
insights of modernity (and postmodernity) leads only to the
backwaters of a legal fundamentalism.
Finally, Part III will initiate the application of the
normative, traditional, and communal model described in Part II
to a particular legal issue common to the first year of virtually
all law school curricula-the doctrine of excuse on account of
impossibility in the law of contracts.' 0 The initiation of the
discussion of a multiperspectival approach to the legal doctrine
of contractual impossibility will only touch on the resources to be
considered in connection with this approach.
I. SCRIPTURES, TRADITION, AND THE LAW SCHOOL: AUTHORITY
IN DIALOGUE
The aspirations in the mission statement pertaining to
"bring[ing] to bear the will of our Creator, Almighty God, upon
legal education and the legal profession" and "grounding...
students in biblical foundations of law, legal institutions, and
processes" presuppose two elements. The first of these
implications obliges each faculty member to attempt to discern
the will of God revealed both in the Scriptures" and the created
order pertaining to the subject of investigation. The reference to
"foundations" and "processes" suggests the second element: that
implementation of the mission statement demands knowledge of
how our forebears in the Christian tradition have discerned and
implemented what they understand as God's will with respect to
those subjects.
A. The Authority of Scripture: The First Voice in the Dialogue
This article will not rehearse the long history of discussions
within the Christian tradition about the nature and extent of
biblical authority. The University was founded squarely within
10 This example of the application of the model discussed in Part II is intended
as no more than the prolegomenon to a final work of scholarship on the doctrine of
contractual impossibility. I simply hope it serves as a means of demonstrating how a
faculty member can carry out the mission in a particular context without sacrificing
biblical, historical, or analytic integrity.
11 Although not explicitly set forth in the mission statement, the Law School
mandates that the Christian Scriptures comprised in what are commonly referred to
as the Old and New Testaments are the authoritative Word of God. See Statement
of Faith %A, infra note 12.
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the modern protestant evangelical tradition and the Statement
of Faith to which the faculty must subscribe makes clear the
priority of Scripture to the implementation of the mission
statement.' 2 Yet, the variety of Christian traditions represented
among the faculty of the Law School' 3 suggests a variety of
responses to the question of what it means to subscribe to the
proposition that "the Holy Bible is the inspired, infallible and
authoritative source of Christian doctrine and precept."14
While a variety of definitions of biblical authority may be
consistent with the Statement of Faith, an individual member of
12 The entirety of the Statement of Faith reads as follows:
A. That the Holy Bible is the inspired, infallible and authoritative source of
Christian doctrine and precept.
B. That there is one God, eternally existent in three persons: Father, Son
and Holy Spirit.
C. That man was created in the image of God but, as a result of sin, is lost
and powerless to save himself.
D. That the only hope for man is to believe on [sic] the Lord Jesus Christ,
the virgin-born Son of God, who died to take upon Himself the punishment
for the sin of mankind, and who rose from the dead, so that by receiving
Him as Savior and Lord, man is redeemed by His blood.
E. That Jesus Christ will personally return to earth in power and glory.
F. That the Holy Spirit indwells those who receive Christ for the purpose of
enabling them to live righteous and holy lives.
G. That the Church is the Body of Christ and is comprised of all those who
through belief in Christ have been spiritually regenerated by the
indwelling Holy Spirit. The mission of the Church is worldwide
evangelization and the nurturing and discipling of Christians.
Regent University Faculty Application Form (visited Feb. 6, 2001) <http-J/
www.regent.edu/admin/prsnellfaculty/application.html>. The lack of any reference
to early creedal statements or later confessional standards of the Church should not
go unnoticed. The University, like most modern evangelical Christian organizations,
presumes either that the teachings of the Bible are so clear that substantial
elaboration is unnecessary, or that consistency of interpretations of those teachings
by the faculty is unimportant. See infra text accompanying notes 43-45.
13 Current members of the Law School faculty identify themselves with
Christian denominations ranging from Baptist, to Episcopalian, to Presbyterian, to
Roman Catholic, to independent non-denominational congregations.
14 For example, a Roman Catholic might suggest that Scriptural authority is
correlative to the apostolic tradition entrusted to the Church: " 'Sacred Tradition
and Sacred Scripture ... are bound closely together and communicate one with the
other' .... 'Each of them makes present and fruitful in the Church the mystery of
Christ....' " UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH 26 (1994). On the other hand, a contemporary evangelical in the
charismatic tradition might claim that Scriptural authority is correlative to
personal revelation: "[God] is ready to grant through His Spirit a spirit of revelation
and wisdom ... and also through revelation and prophecy to speak to His people." J.
RODMAN WILLIAMS, RENEWAL THEOLOGY: SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY FROM A
CHARISMATIC PERSPECTIVE 44 (1996).
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the faculty of the Law School should be able to articulate the
definition he or she employs. This faculty member has adopted
the following brief statement of scriptural authority under which
to achieve the goals of the mission statement:
Holy Scripture, being God's own Word, written by men
prepared and superintended by His Spirit, is of infallible divine
authority in all matters upon which it touches: it is to be
believed, as God's instruction, in all that it affirms; obeyed, as
God's command, in all that it requires; embraced, as God's
pledge, in all that it promises.' 5
Confession of a high degree of confidence in the authority of
the Bible carries with it substantial benefits as well as certain
dangers. The benefits of a touchstone of epistemic and moral
authority in the current climate of ethical and legal relativism
should be apparent. In fact, it is axiomatic that because all
knowledge is interrelated, "unless there is comprehensive
knowledge of all things somewhere there can be no knowledge
anywhere."16 Since the collapse of the Christian-Aristotelian
synthesis in the seventeenth century and the failure of the
subsequent totality of rationalistic and empiricistic enterprises
of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, both
philosophers and ethicists have lost a firm foundation on which
to ground their precepts.' 7 The existence of the authoritative
15 THE CHICAGO STATEMENT ON BIBLICAL INERRANCY (1978), reprinted in W.
GRUDEM, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO BIBLICAL DOCTRINE 1204
(1994).
16 ROBERT L. REYMOND, A NEW SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY OF THE CHRISTIAN
FAITH 111 (1998). Interestingly, the view of knowledge as a web of multiple
reciprocities finds its ablest exponent in the works of the well-known empiricist
William Van Orman Quine. See, e.g., W.V. QUME, THEORIES AND THINGS (1981);
W.V. QUnE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF (2d ed. 1978). For a lucid account of
Quine's version of empiricism, see LYNN HAWKINS NELSON, WHO KNOWS: FROM
QUINE TO A FEMINIST EMPIRICISM (1990).
17 The empirical ethicist faces the problem that "empiricism cannot justify any
statements about ethical values. Statements about sensible facts do not imply
anything about ethical goodness or badness, right or wrong, or obligation or
prohibition." JOHN M. FRAME, THE DOCTRINE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 118
(1987). The purely rationalistic ethicist ultimately fares no better. While there may
be instances of a priori knowledge, e.g., the laws of logic, awareness of our own
mental states, the existence of objective truth, etc., we can "deduce very little from
such a priori ideas.... [W]e cannot deduce the whole fabric of human knowledge
from them or even enough knowledge to constitute a meaningful philosophy." Id. at
113. Efforts simply to combine empiricism and rationalism beginning with
Immanuel Kant evidence an incoherent dialectic and remain vulnerable to the
weakness of each approach standing alone. The inward turn (such as the collective
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Scriptures provides a faculty member, operating in light of the
confession of the mission statement, with the necessary
"Archimedean point" from which to criticize, analyze, and apply
elements of the law today.'8
The principal danger for one confessing biblical authority is
a form of objectivism that asserts that "interpretation [of the
Scriptures] .. . [is] a process of stripping away preconceptions
and applying carefully conceived techniques, so that texts may
make their own impression on us."19  Modern students of
hermeneutics, whether biblical or legal, have demonstrated that
the element of human subjectivity can never be separated from
the process and results of interpretation. 20 Without recognition
of the necessarily subjective element in interpretation, persons
from across the theological spectrum frequently overestimate
historicism of Hegel or the individual subjectivism of Kierkegaard) cannot provide a
firm foundation for objective truth or goodness. Nonetheless, resignation to
subjectivism seems to have carried the day for most contemporary students of ethics
or jurisprudence. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN
MORAL THEOLOGY 6-34 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1981) (discussing "emotivism).
18 In order to use the Scriptures to analyze the law, faculty members must
realize that
[the Christian] recognizes that in the fact of Scripture itself he has a truly
profound solution to man's need for an infinite reference point if knowledge
is to become a reality. He understands that because there is comprehensive
knowledge with God, real and true knowledge is possible for man, since
God who knows all the data exhaustively in all their infinite
relationships.., is in the position to impart any portion of that true
knowledge to man. The Christian believes that this is precisely what God
did when he revealed himself to man propositionally.
REYMOND, supra note 16, at 115.
19 RICHARD L. PRATT, JR., HE GAVE Us STORIES: THE BIBLE STUDENT'S GUIDE
TO INTERPRETING OLD TESTAMENT NARRATIVES 29 (1993).
20 See, e.g., Moisds Silva, The Place of Historical Reconstruction in New
Testament Criticism, in HERMENEUTICS, AUTHORITY, AND CANON 105 (D.A. Carson
& J. Woodbridge eds., 1986); Ian Crosby, Words in Stone: Gadamer, Heidegger, and
Originalism, 76 TEx. L. REV. 849, 854 (1998) ("Interpretation is circular: we come to
interpretation with a nonexplicit background understanding of what it is to be the
kind of beings we are in the world.., and this understanding sets our inquiry's
terms and boundaries."); see generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD
353, 356-57 (2d ed. 1975).
To understand [the author's past situation] does not mean primarily to
reason one's way back into the past, but to have a present involvement in
what is said [because] texts do not ask to be understood as a living
expression of the subjectivity of their writers.... What is fixed in writing
has detached itself from the contingency of its origin and its author and
made itself free for new relationships.
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their ability to unveil the objective meaning of a text.21
The Statement of Faith demands that the Law School
faculty give the Bible a principal place in their efforts to
implement certain aspirations of the mission statement.
22
Failure of the faculty to recognize their personal contributions to
the results of biblical interpretation, however, can undermine
other elements of the mission statement.23
B. The Authority of the Faculty: The Second Voice in the
Dialogue
1. Faculty as Individuals
Notwithstanding an appeal to Scripture as an objective voice
of authority, modern evangelical Protestantism has tended
toward overconfident objectivism in biblical interpretation.
[W]e sometimes hear people defend as ideal the notion that in
reading the Scriptures we must first empty ourselves of all
preconceptions and simply allow Scripture to write its message
on our open and empty minds as on a clean slate. This is an
impossible possibility-possible in the sense that some may try
it, but impossible in the sense that no one can live up to it. For
we can never escape ourselves, or divest ourselves of our
convictions, or turn ourselves off.2 4
Others have moved in the opposite direction into an
excessive subjectivism. On the left are those associated with
liberation theology and feminist or gay interpretations.
Theologians such as Jose Croatto openly celebrate subjectivism
in interpretation: "exegesis is eisegesis, and anybody who claims
to be doing only the former is, wittingly or unwittingly, engaged
21 See PRATT, supra note 19, at 30.
22 "The mission of the School of Law is to bring to bear the will of our Creator,
Almighty God, upon legal education and the legal profession. In particular, this
mission includes ... [tihe grounding of students in biblical foundations of law, legal
institutions, and processes...." Mission Statement (visited Feb. 6, 2000)
<http/vww.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/welcome/missiom.html>.
23 In particular, "[tihe nurturing and encouragement of students to become
mature Christians who exercise the gifts of the Holy Spirit and display the fruit of
the Holy Spirit in their personal and professional lives." Id. Uncritical assertions of
simplistic biblical prescriptions can lead to either uncritical (and unprofessional)
acceptance of those prescriptions or an instinctive rejection of them, neither of
which is consistent with achieving the third element of the mission statement.
24 GORDON J. SPYKMAN, REFORMATIONAL THEOLOGY: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
DOING DOGMATICS 121 (1992).
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in ideological subterfuge."25  On the right, few would
acknowledge their subjectivistic tendencies, yet their failure to
acknowledge the part they play in biblical interpretation simply
masks their conclusions with a patina of objectivism. 26
The dangers of an uncritical objectivism on the one hand
and blatant subjectivism on the other cannot be ignored if the
Law School is to carry out its mission.27 The authority-dialogue
model offers a means by which to avoid these threats while
maintaining the absolute authority of the Scriptures described
above.28 A dialogic model of interpretation is one where the
relationship between the text and the reader can be described as
a conversational give-and-take. 29  The reader of the text
approaches with certain questions in mind.30 The text answers
those questions, but in turn, those answers shape the interpreter
whose subsequent questions cannot help but take into account
the results of the first series of inquiries. 31
In order to avoid sheer prejudice, it is necessary to allow the
25 J. SEVERINO CROATTO, EXODUS: A HERMENEUTICS OF FREEDOM 2 (Salvator
Attamasio, trans., 1981); see also ELIZABETH A. CASTELLI, IMITATING PAUL: A
DISCOURSE OF POWER 13 (1991) (describing the Apostle Paul's admonition that
others should imitate him, 1 Corinthians 11:1, to be a political move by which he
privileged himself and marginalized those who disagreed with him); J. SEVERINO
CROATTO, BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICs: TOWARD A THEORY OF READING AS THE
PRODUCTION OF MEANING 70 (Orbis Books 1987) (1984) ("We must re-create the
message of the Bible, not just 'update' it.").
26 See, e.g., ROBERT L. DABNEY, A DEFENCE OF VIRGINIA 92-198 (1867)
(attempting to justify the African slave trade in America).
27 In interpreting the Bible:
We must remember that, though the Bible is infallible, our own
understanding of the Bible is not. Hence some practice of critical self-
doubt.., is in order. As long as this doubting characterizes ourselves,
rather than doubting God or doubting the Bible as God's Word, we are
acting in conformity with Christian standards.
VERN S. POYTHRESS, SCIENCE AND HERMENEUTICS 123 (1988).
28 See PRATT, supra note 19.
29 See PRATT, supra note 19, at 32.
30 "[We come [to the Bible] with our own expectations and questions that
prepare us for meaningful dialogue." Id. "We approach Scripture with a certain
sense of anticipation--expecting something." SPYKMAN, supra note 24, at 121.
31 The dialogic approach does not mean that truth is always beyond our grasp:
This does not mean real knowledge is impossible. Rather, it means that
real knowledge is close to impossible if we fail to recognize our own
assumption, questions, interests, and biases; but if we recognize them and,
in dialogue with the text seek to make allowances for them, we will be
better able to avoid confusing our own world-views with those of the
biblical writers.
D.A. CARSON, EXEGETICAL FALLACIES 104-05 (2d ed. 1996).
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text or evidence to reshape one's pre-understanding. Unless this
is done quite deliberately, there is the risk that one's starting
point, instead of acting as a window to the evidence, will become
a filter through which the text is always read-and distorted.32
The nature of biblical authority acknowledged above,
however, imparts a different weight to the results of dialogue
with the Scriptures. If the words of one party to the dialogue are
infallible and divine, then the answers of that party to the
questions asked of it carry the same authority.33 Nonetheless,
even answers based on infallible and divine revelation remain
human constructs that in turn are subject to critique and
evaluation in light of the authoritative Scriptures.34
This reciprocal relationship between the authoritative text
and the questioner who returns to the text with a provisional
answer can be described as a hermeneutical spiral. 5 The
metaphor of a spiral (rather than a line) acknowledges the
reality of an interpreter's pre-understanding in the analysis of a
text. Yet the spiral (instead of a circle) also avoids the relativism
of a purely subjective approach. The spiral recognizes both the
starting point of objective truth in the revelation of God and the
ability of those who were created in the image of God to begin to
grasp that objective truth.
Finally, although not specifically addressed in the mission
statement, a faculty member at the Law School should not
32 See G. Stanton, Interpreting the New Testament Today, in EX ADDITU 68
(1985).
33 As the Westminster Confession of Faith puts it, the authority of the Bible
extends not only to what it says, but also to those matters which "by good and
necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture." THE WESTMINSTER
CONFESSION OF FAITH, ch. 1.6 (1647), reprinted in 3 PHILIP SCHAFF, THE CREEDS OF
CHRISTENDOM 603 (1877).
34 In interpreting the authoritative Scriptures:
The authority-dialogue model stands in contrast to both subjective and
objective tendencies. In contrast to objectivism, it recognizes the constant
influence of preconceptions on interpretation.... In contrast to
subjectivism, the authority-dialogue model recognizes the importance of
having methods that allow us to hear [the Scriptures] speak
authoritatively to our lives.
PRATT, supra note 19, at 33; see also THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH,
supra note 33, at 605-06.
35 See CARSON, supra note 31, at 129; ANTHONY C. THISTELTON, THE TWO
HORIZONS, NEW TESTAMENT HERMENEUTICS AND PHILOSOPHICAL DESCRIPTION
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO HEIDEGGER, BULTMANN, GADAMER, AND
NITTGENSTEIN 104 (1980); see also GRANT R. OSBORNE, THE HERMENEUTICAL
SPIRAL: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION TO BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
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ignore the role of the Holy Spirit in interpretation. Classical
theological formulations describe two aspects of the work of the
Spirit in interpretation: first, to convince us that the Scriptures
are the revelation of God36 and second, to progressively awaken
our understanding of the significance of that revelation.37 While
a faculty member need not affirm that this facet of interpretation
includes new revelatory material, the process of understanding
authoritative revelation certainly includes subjective changes in
the interpreter. 38
2. Faculty as Inheritors of a Tradition
The dialogue of a faculty member with the authoritative
Scriptures does not occur in an historical vacuum: it is never
"just me and my Bible."39 Failure to recognize the place one
36 See, e.g., THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note 33, ch. 1.5, at
603 ("[Olur full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine
authority thereof [i.e., holy Scripture], is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit,
bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.").
37 See id. ch. 1.6, at 603-04 ("[Wle acknowledge the inward illumination of the
Spirit of God to be necessary for the saving understanding of such things as are
revealed in the Word."); see also THE CHICAGO STATEMENT ON BIBLICAL INERRANCY,
supra note 15, at 1204 ("The Holy Spirit, Scripture's divine Author, both
authenticates it to us by His inward witness and opens our minds to understand its
meaning.").
38 "[The Spirit operates in our hearts and minds ... to illumine and persuade
us of the divine words and deeds." John M. Frame, The Spirit and the Scriptures, in
HERMENEUTICS, AUTHORITY, AND CANON, supra note 20, at 230-31; see also F.
Klooster, The Role of the Holy Spirit in the Hermeneutic Process: The Relationship of
the Spirit's Illumination to Biblical Interpretation, in HERMENEUTIC, INERRANCY,
AND THE BIBLE 464 (E. Radmacher & R. Preus eds., 1984) ('The unbeliever's
preunderstanding must be fundamentally redirected by the regenerating power of
the Holy Spirit. A believer's preunderstanding may require reformation (re-forming)
within the regenerated heart through the Spirit's illumination."); see also 1 JOHN
CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, ch. 7, at 80 (McNeill ed., 1960)
("[The certainty [Scripture] deserves with us, it attains by the testimony of the
Spirit.").
39 It must be understood that
when we seek to escape the bonds of tradition, we merely substitute one
set of preconceptions for another. Indeed, what we do then is to substitute
our own half-baked, ill-conceived preconceptions for the mature thought of
godly teachers. To try to start totally afresh ("just me and my Bible"), as
many cultists have tried to do, is an act of disobedience and pride.
FRAME, supra note 17, at 304. In fact, perceiving oneself as a free agent in
interpretation is a post-Enlightenment concept previously unknown in Church
history. See Mois~s Silva, Has the Church Misread the Bible?, in FOUNDATIONS OF
CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATION 72-74 (Moisds Silva ed., 1996).
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occupies in the historic tradition of biblical interpretation40 can
lead to individualism and uncritical subjectivism just as easily as
can the overconfident objectivism described above.4 1  The
practice of biblical interpretation is hardly new. The Hebrew
Scriptures disclose a canonical interaction with earlier texts. 42
The additional Scriptures of the Christian faith are principally
an interpretation and application of the life and words of Jesus
in terms of the categories of the Hebrew Scriptures. 43 The
practice of Christian interpretive dialogue has continued from
the close of the apostolic era up to today. It is surely a serious
omission for one engaged in dialogue with the Scriptures today
to ignore the results of the previous 1900 years of questions and
answers. The previous dialogue sets the boundaries of orthodoxy
for the faculty of a Christian university.4 4 A faculty member
seeking to realize the mission of the Law School cannot ignore
the results of the dialogue of the Church with the authoritative
40 "Tradition," as defined by Richard Lints, "refer[s] to the entire collected
expressions of biblical interpretation (written and unwritten) to which particular
past communities have committed themselves and by which they have sought to
transmit their faith to subsequent generations." RICHARD LINTS, THE FABRIC OF
THEOLOGY: A PROLEGOMENON TO EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY 84 (1993).
41 For an excellent discussion of the impact that the triumph of individualism
in America's political revolution had on the religious landscape from the 1790s
through 1835, see NATHAN 0. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN
CHRISTIANITY (1989).
42 See WILLIAM C. PLACHER, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY: AN
INTRODUCTION 18-31 (1983) (providing an extended discussion of the theological
dialog carried on by the deuteronomistic historians and the writing prophets with
the prescriptions of the Mosaic covenantal regime). For two examples of this
dialogue, see the explicit consideration of a text from Jeremiah 29:10 in the
subsequent book of Daniel 9:2 and the implicit analysis and application of Leviticus
25:4 by the Chronicler in 2 Chronicles 36:21.
43 Current New Testament scholarship has largely rejected the view
popularized in the nineteenth century that the Christian Scriptures simply
represented another hellenized mystery religion. Nonetheless, only a few
theologians have engaged in an evaluation of the New Testament writings from a
thoroughgoing covenantal standpoint consonant with the perspective of the Hebrew
Scriptures. See HERIAN RIDDERBOS, THE COMING OF THE KINGDOM (Raymond 0.
Zorn ed. & H. de Jongste trans., 1962) (providing an able exposition of this
approach); HERMAN N. RIDDERBOS, PAUL: AN OUTLINE OF HIS THEOLOGY (1966).
4 See, e.g., The Nicene Creed formally adopted by the Church at the Council of
Chalcedon in 451, reprinted in 1 SCHAFF, supra note 33, at 27-29 (1877); see
generally 1 KENNETH LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY: BEGINNINGS TO
1500, at 187 (1953) ("While Christianity was winning the professed allegiance of the
overwhelming majority of the population of the Roman Empire and was being
carried beyond the Roman borders, it was ... seeking to define what Christians
deemed the essential convictions of their faith.").
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Scriptures represented in the early ecumenical creeds,45 as well
as the deliberative results of at least the first four principal
ecumenical councils.46
Notwithstanding the high level of authority represented in
the creeds of the first 500 hundred years of the Church, a faculty
member will find most contemporary legal questions are not
answered in them. A faculty member will, however, find many
modern legal questions addressed throughout the history of
Christian theologizing.47  Progressive realization of the
aspirations of the mission statement therefore requires the
faculty to address not only the relevant Scriptural witness but
also the dialogue of his or her forebears in the faith.
3. Faculty as Present Community
As much as the faculty stands at the modern edge of an
ongoing historical tradition of biblical interpretation, they are
also part of a currently existing community of legal scholars.48
This community includes those who share the aspirations of the
mission statement and confess the truths of the Statement of
Faith, as well as those who do not. 49 Conversely, those who do
45 The so-called Ecumenical Creeds are generally deemed to include the
Apostles' Creed, the Nicene Creed, and the Athanasian Creed. See 1 SCHAFF, supra
note 33, at 12-42. Most churches in the Western tradition acknowledge the
authority of these creeds. See generally 1 LATOURETTE, supra note 44, at 155-56,
303-04.
46 Various Christian traditions debate the number and identity of the
authoritative councils of the early Church. Most would assent to the conclusions
reached at Nicea (325), Constantinople (381), Ephesus 1 (431), and Chalcedon (451).
See 1 SCHAFF, supra note 33, at 43-45. Additional councils to which various
Christian traditions accord authoritative status include Constantinople II (553),
Constantinople III (680), and Nicea II (787). See id.; see generally 1 LATOURE'ITE,
supra note 44, at 153-88, 284-86, 291-92.
47 The practice of theology itself is the process of authority-dialogue:
There is, in fact, no important distinction to be made at all between
meaning and application .... To find "meaning" is to ask a question of
Scripture, to express a need, and to have that need met. To "apply" is to
learn more of what is in the text, to see more of its potential, its powers, its
wisdom.
FRAME, supra note 17, at 83.
48 "It is important that we keep in mind the fact that the construction of a
theological framework and the appropriation of a theological vision are properly
tasks of the Christian community and not of isolated individuals." LINTS, supra note
40, at 286.
49 The Reformed tradition of Western Christianity describes the benefits
rendered even by those who do not share a common faith commitment as "common
grace." See, e.g., L. BERKHOF, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 432-46 (4th ed. 11th prtg.
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not subscribe to these propositions must acknowledge the
significance of the historic acceptance of their truth throughout
the course of the common law until well into the nineteenth
century.50 The relationship among these perspectives can be
diagramed as follows:
Normative
Historical n Existential
Figure 1: The Perspectival
Paradigm
Thus, a faculty member at the Law School should seek to
discover the normative "will of Almighty God" in the Scriptures
in dialogue with the Scriptures, within an historical tradition,
and as part of a present community. The faculty member who
fails to consider any of these three perspectives runs the danger
of absolutizing a particular construct and stunting further
growth.
4. The FLIC Report
The aspects of the mission statement relevant to this article
concern the goals of serious Scriptural integration and
meaningful historical analysis. Several of the models identified
in the FLIC Report relate in part to these objectives. 51 None of
1969); CALVIN, supra note 38, at 769-70.
50 Compare HAROLD JOSEPH BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION
OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION vi (1983) ("In the twentieth century ... for the
first time, religion has become largely a private affair, while law has become largely
a matter of practical expediency. The connection between the religious metaphor
and the legal metaphor has been broken."), with NORTHROP FRYE, THE GREAT
CODE: THE BIBLE AND LITERATURE xii (1982) ("I soon realized that a student of
English literature who does not know the Bible does not understand a good deal of
what is going on in what he reads . . ").
51 In particular, the Christian Professional Focus, the Lexical Focus, and the
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these methods, however, clearly specifies a paradigm by which to
account fully for the role of Christian tradition together with
interpretation in community. The role these two perspectives
play in the dialogue in which the faculty member engages with
Scripture must be clearly articulated.
The Institutes Focus is most closely aligned with an
historically informed dialogic perspective.5 2 The FLIC Report
describes the implementation of the Institutes Focus by
Professor Craig Stern in part as follows:
Regular prayerful study of the Holy Scriptures with an eye
towards receiving truth for his [i.e., the faculty member's]
ministry at Regent.
Study of legal materials as informed by biblical principles.
When appropriate, referring to the Scriptures in the original
languages, to traditional interpretations, to the sensus fidelium,
etc.
Arriving at and applying appropriate pedagogy for leading
students into participating in this integration.
In all these efforts, frequent consultation with colleagues has
been invaluable. 53
This Institutes Focus identifies the three elements of the
dialogic model described above: Scripture as primary authority,
interpretation in light of tradition, and interpretation in
community. Part II of this article will describe a model in which
these three components are perspectively related. Nonetheless,
even if these three perspectives are valid in the context of
biblical interpretation, the question remains how they relate to
legal teaching and scholarship at the Law School.
C. Dialogue with the Law: Can We Answer Today's Questions
While Ignoring the Past?
While what has preceded in this discussion is appropriate to
problems of theology narrowly understood, the question of its
relevance to the law remains open. The perspectives of the
normative, traditional, and existential must be reconsidered in
the context of the common law.
Institutes Focus relate to these objectives. See supra note 7.
52 See id.
53 Memorandum distributed at the Regent University faculty retreat (August
28, 1998) (on file with author).
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1. The Authority of the Common Law
At one point in history, the common law itself came to have
an authoritative voice. 54 The common law was not simply the
object of study, it was the historically instantiated expression of
a higher law.55 While never equal to the Scriptures, for someone
like William Blackstone, the long series of pronouncements of
the English courts came to have a mystical, quasi-canonical
status: "[the courts] are the depositaries of the laws; the living
oracles .... [Tihese judicial decisions are the principal and most
authoritative evidence.., of the existence of such a custom as
shall form a part of the common law."56 Not only were the
common law courts "living oracles," Blackstone asserted that
even if no one could recall a reason for a particular common law
rule, it was nonetheless the case "that whenever a standing rule
of law... hath been wantonly broken in upon by statues or new
resolutions, the wisdom of the rule hath in the end appeared
from the inconveniences that have followed the innovation."57 If
Blackstone represented the apotheosis of a vision of the common
law as higher law, its virtually unquestionable authority was not
to last many more years.
The numinous authority of the common law came under
attack beginning with Blackstone's student Jeremy Bentham in
54 This point was probably in the mid-seventeenth century during and after the
Puritan Revolution. See Harold J. Berman, The Religious Sources of General
Contract Law: An Historical Perspective, 4 J. LAW & REL. 103, 115 (1986) ("The
Puritan Revolution of 1640 to 1660 established the supremacy of the common law
over its rivals."); Harold J. Berman & Charles Reid, Jr., The Transformation of
English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 450 (1996) ("In
the seventeenth century, after Coke and his colleagues had challenged the
prerogative courts and the king himself in the name of pre-Tudor precedents, the
concept of the historical continuity of case law became a central element of the
common-law tradition.").
5 JEFFREY A. BRAUCH, Is HIGHER LAW COMMON LAW? READINGS ON THE
INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 1-68 (1999).
58 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69 (2d
rev. ed., Chicago & Co. 1879).
57 Id. at 70. As Daniel Boorstin describes it, "If]or many of his judgments
Blackstone depended on his intuitions of the 'genius of the common law,' and the
'spirit of our constitution.'... Genii and spirits were natural paraphernalia of the
Mystery of Law." DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW: AN
ESSAY ON BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 29 (1941). Later, Boorstin describes
Blackstone's view of law as follows: "The determinism which had made the legal
system of any country, in God's design, the product partly of climate and of the
stage of social development, also made it the product of its innate 'spirit' or
'genius.' "Id. at 57.
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1776.58 It appears that the very efforts of Blackstone to
rationalize the common law undermined its imposing status.,9
The acid of Bentham's thoroughgoing rationalism eroded
Blackstone's appeals to history and mystery as justifications for
the authority of the common law.60 Weakened by Bentham, it
remained for the jurisprudence of John Austin to reorganize law
on a positivistic and utilitarian basis.61  Left without its
traditional means of support, autonomous instrumental human
reason supplanted the common law as the standard of authority:
the common law was commanding only when it was rational.62
2. Faculty as Inheritors of a Legal Tradition and Members of a
Legal Community
"Tradition," according to moral philosopher Alasdair
MacIntyre, is "an historically extended, socially embodied
argument... in part about the goods which constitute that
tradition."63 The goods of a tradition are a part of its practice,
which MacIntyre defines as
58 See JEREMY BENTHAM, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on
Government, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (J.H. Burns and
H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977).
59 Part of the reason for Bentham's disdain for Blackstone's version of the
science of the law may have been the different meaning that "science" had for the
two thinkers. For Blackstone, "science" still retained its older sense of simply an
organized body of knowledge. Bentham, by contrast, understood science in terms of
the natural sciences with their empiricistic methods and truncated verification
techniques. See generally Howard Schweber, The "Science" of Legal Science: The
Model of the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17
LAW & HIST. REV. 421 (1999); see also RICHARD A. COSGROVE, SCHOLARS OF THE
LAW: ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE FROM BLACKSTONE TO HART 56 (1996) ("Bentham
accused Blackstone of linguistic imprecision because the Commentator used allusion
and metaphor to portray the law, whereas Bentham asserted that only the language
of science could succeed as an instrument of legal analysis.").
60 See BOORSTIN, supra note 57, at 189-90.
61 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE
USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 193 (1954) ("Every positive law, or every
law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of
persons, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that
person or body is sovereign or supreme.").
62 See BOORSTIN, supra note 57, at 190 ("Jeremy Bentham is the prototype of
the critics of Blackstone .... [He] demonstrated to his own and his disciples'
satisfaction that the Commentaries were worthless because they were not clearly
reasoned."); see also Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence:
Politics, Morality, History, 76 CAL. L. REV. 779, 783 (1988) (discussing the post-
Enlightenment efforts to ground ultimate legal authority in a source other than
God).
63 MACINTYRE, supra note 17, at 222; cf. LINTS, supra note 40, at 84.
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any coherent and complex form of socially established
cooperative human activity through which goods internal to
that form of society are realized in the course of trying to
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to,
and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically
extended. 64
The authority of tradition has been fundamental to the
historical understanding of the common law.65  Yet, a
rationalistic or even utilitarian approach to the law cannot help
but denigrate the significance of tradition.66 Only that which can
pass rational muster or lead to a better social result will satisfy a
participant in the modern autonomous enterprise.67 MacIntyre
responds to the empty rationalism of modern ethical theorizing68
by re-emphasizing teleology: there are "goods" to which
humanity can aspire, goods that mark out the goal to which a
legal system should be oriented.69 MacIntyre does not, however,
posit an a priori definition of this "good."70 He instead anchors
his version of the good in those virtues such as justice, courage,
64 MACINTYRE, supra note 17, at 187; see also Michael J. Perry, The Authority
of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation",
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 594 (1985) ("A tradition, then, connotes not consensus, but
dissensus and consensus. A tradition is constituted in part by an argument as to
how that which is shared should be understood and socially embodied.").
65 See Mortimer Sellers, Republicanism, Liberalism, and the Law, 86 KY. L.J. 1,
27 (1997-1998) ("[E]arly liberals embraced law as the proper line between liberty
and license, and took judges or the common law tradition as the best source of
authority, rather than any public deliberative process.").
66 Following Blackstone and his enormous respect for tradition as its own
ground of authority, the increasing influence of modernity can be discerned in
Bentham and those who have come after him. Modernity in this sense can be
distinguished from tradition "by the increasing affirmation that ... understandings
of reality... cannot be validated or redeemed by appeals to some authoritative
expression or tradition or institution." FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE DIVINE GOOD:
MODERN MORAL THEORY AND THE NECESSITY OF GOD 3-4 (1990).
67 "In other words, our understandings can be validated or redeemed only by
appeal in some sense to human experience and reason as such." Id. at 4.
68 See supra note 17 (summarizing MacIntyre's description of emotivism).
69 See MACINTYRE, supra note 17, at 52 ("[Ihe joint effect of the secular
rejection of both Protestant and Catholic theology and the scientific and
philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism was to eliminate any notion of man-as-he-
could-be-if-he realised-his-telos.").
70 Maclntyre's reticence here is surprising given his description of himself as an
"Augustinian Christian." See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH
RATIONALITY? 10 (1988).
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and honesty that contribute to humanity's ongoing historical
quest for the good, however it is viewed from within a particular
tradition.71 The virtuous quest is not one directed to a particular
goal so much as one that recognizes and sustains the belief that
there is a good or a telos at all.72 This quest on an individual
scale for MacIntyre includes participating in a variety of
subsidiary practices (such as the law) in which the application of
certain virtues contributes toward humanity's goal of identifying
and achieving its ultimate good. And it is in the context of these
practices that the distinction between internal and external
goods, or to put it another way, between virtue and success,
becomes apparent.
Internal goods are identifiable in two ways: first, they can be
specified and achieved only by and within a particular practice,
such as law. Second, unlike external goods, internal goods can
only be obtained by genuine excellence involved in the practice
itself. External goods, by contrast, are "externally and
contingently attached ... by the accidents of social
circumstance." 73 External goods such as fame, income, status or
prestige, though real, are not peculiar to a practice itself. There
are ways other than successfully engaging in a practice like law
by which to obtain external goods, but there is no way other than
by the perfection of the practice to obtain internal goods. One
may certainly engage in the activity of law for the sake of income
or fame, but to do so is not to engage in the practice of law.7 4
71 In MacIntyre's discussion of the "good," he noted that:
It is looking for a conception of the good which will enable us to order other
goods, for a conception of the good which will enable us to extend our
understanding of the purpose and content of the virtues, for a conception of
the good which will enable us to understand the place of integrity and
constancy in life, that we initially define the kind of life which is a quest
for the good.
MACINTYRE, supra note 17, at 204.
72 Thus Macntyre's emphasis is on narrative as both the primary
representation of human life and the necessity of understanding one's life as part of
a narrative: "[Mian is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions,
essentially a story-telling animal.... I can only answer the question 'What am I to
do?' if I can answer the prior question 'Of what story or stories do I find my self a
part?' "Id. at 201.
7 Id. at 188.
74 One need not, and in fact, could not consistently with the mission statement,
accept Macntyre's radically historicistic version of the human telos. Yet to affirm
the existence of an a priori goal (such as "true justice") toward which faculty at the
Law School should strive is certainly consistent with the mission statement.
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Although the exercise of virtues, such as justice, courage, and
honesty will further the human quest, they may not produce a
high standard of living.
MacIntyre's analysis of the relationship between a tradition,
its practices, and their internal goods leads to three related sets
of questions. First, what is the historical tradition within which
a member of the faculty teaching a common law subject at the
Law School is a part? What is the relationship between that
tradition, its authority, and the authority of the Scriptures that
the faculty also confesses? Next, what is the nature of the
practice in which the faculty is to be engaged? And third, what
are the internal goods of this tradition?
Some would assert that the common law itself is the answer
to the first question. Unlike the canonical Scriptures, however,
the content of the common law is not fixed. The authoritative
"text" of customs recognized and enforced by the common law
courts and the judicial interpretations of that customary history
merge to become the common law.7 5 The dialogic interpretation
of the results of preceding common law adjudication by
subsequent courts expresses the tradition of which both are
components. There has been no common legal controversy
comparable to the debate between the Roman Catholic Church
and Protestants in general over the proper relationship between
text and tradition.7 6 For someone like Oliver Wendell Holmes
75 See, e.g., HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (15th ed. 1894). In
particular, Maine rejected the claims of predecessors such as Jeremy Bentham and
John Austin that the only law was positive law: "Maine preferred a more spacious
approach to the problem of what might be termed law .... 'Opinion, beliefs,
sentiments, superstitions, ideas of all kind-in short the historical culture in which
sovereignty arose and functioned...' [were also law]." COSGROVE, supra note 59, at
133-34 (footnote omitted).
76 For descriptions of the historic differences between the Roman Catholic
Church and Protestantism, compare DECREE CONCERNING THE CANONICAL
SCRIPTURES, THE CANONS AND DOGMATIC DECREES OF THE FOURTH SESSION OF
THE COUNCIL OF TRENT, reprinted in 2 SCHAFF, supra note 33, at 80 (The Christian
faith rests on "truth and discipline.., contained in the written books, and the
unwritten traditions."), with THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra note
33, ch. 1.10, at 605-06 ("The Supreme Judge, by which all controversies of religion
are to be determined... can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the
Scripture."). For the contemporary positions, compare UNITED STATES CATHOLIC
CONFERENCE, supra note 14, at 24 ("[The Church, to whom the transmission and
interpretation of Revelation is entrusted, 'does not derive her certainty about all
revealed truths from the holy Scriptures alone. Both Scripture and Tradition must
be accepted and honored with equal sentiments of devotion and reverence.' "), with
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who rejects any claim that the common law represents a higher
law, it is still the case that in the field of the common law, the
text is tradition and vice versa.77
Most would intuitively recognize the intimate connection
between the common law as the results of cases and the common
law as the tradition of applying legal rules derived from previous
cases to current controversies. 78 Yet, since the late nineteenth
century, many have questioned the identification of the common
law with its tradition.7 9 The "law and" movement beginning
with sociological jurisprudence in the 1920s sought to ground the
common law in something other than its own expression.80 "The
THE CHICAGO STATEMENT ON BIBLICAL INNERANCY, supra note 15, at 1205 ("We
deny that Church creeds, councils, or declarations have authority greater than or
equal to the authority of the Bible.").
77 See, e.g., O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881); O.W. HOLMES, JR.,
THE PATH OF LAW (1897); see also Berman & Reid, supra note 54, at 438 (tracing
the roots of Holmes' historicism to fundamental changes in the method of English
law in the late seventeenth and early-to-mid-eighteenth centuries). But see Martin
P. Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century America-
Major Themes and Developments, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441 (1986) (arguing the
priority of Holmes' positivism over his historicism).
78 By combining these two concepts of common law, one reaches the conclusion
that
[t]he central tenet of the common law is the principle of stare decisis:
Points of law once decided in an appropriate case should not be reopened in
other cases involving the same point in the same jurisdiction .... The
principle of stare decisis supports the common law doctrine of precedent,
which treats previously decided cases as authorities for the decision of
later cases.
STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 25-26 (2d
ed. 1995).
79 Nonetheless, American jurisprudence never inflated its historical traditions
to the level of an immanent consciousness in the Continental historical
jurisprudence of Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779-1861). See generally F. VON
SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE
(A. Hayward trans., 1831).
80 See, e.g., I, N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAw & ITS STUDY
(3d ed. 1960) (assigning more credence to extra-legal considerations than
sociological jurisprudence); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th
ed. 1998) (describing the common law tradition in terms of economic efficiency);
Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1912) (advocating a self-described "sociological jurisprudence"). There has
also been a critical response to the effort to ground the common law in something
other than its own tradition. See, e.g., DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996)
(describing legal practice as a linguistic ability and thus deflating concerns about
grounding law in anything else); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (advocating a "neutral principles"
approach to decision-making). Professor Stephen Feldman describes the impetus for
these efforts as follows: "Whereas premodernists readily accepted God and nature as
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emphasis on extralegal explanations for legal phenomena has
echoed throughout the twentieth century from sociological
jurisprudence at the beginning to American realism in the 1920s
and 1930s and thence to the critical legal studies movement of
the 1980s."81
The argument between the proponents of the self-
justification of the common law and those who ground it in some
other aspect of the created order seems insoluble.8 2 The mission
statement of the Law School breaks the conundrum by reference
to a transcendent order of truth-"the will of Almighty God."
The authority of the common law is thus equivalent to tradition
in theological interpretation: it is substantial and unavoidable,
but not dispositive.8 3 According to the mission statement and
the Statement of Faith, God's law is the court of final authority,
not the common law tradition, reason, nor any noun following
"law and...".84 Thus, the study of law, in the view of the
foundational sources for value and knowledge, modernists rejected religious,
natural, and other traditional footings and thus searched for some alternative
foundation or Archimedean point." Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to
Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387,
1391 (1997).
81 COSGROVE, supra note 59, at 12.
82 The unabating efforts to resolve the issue between competing and mutually
inconsistent justifications for the law have resulted in derisive criticism. See, e.g.,
Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and
State, 97 COLLUI. L. REV. 2255 (1997); Pierre Schlag, The Empty Circles of Liberal
Justification, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1997).
83 This understanding of the relationship between the common law and the
divine will appears to be consistent with that of the early students of the common
law. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 38-46 (describing the relationship
between the law of nature and divine law, on the one hand, and positive law,
including common law, on the other); see generally BOORSTIN, supra note 57, at 53-
59 (discussing the means by which Blackstone related God's law to the common
law).
84 The mission statement reveals that it is rooted in the pre-modern. See
Feldman, supra note 80, at 1389 ("A distinctive feature of premodernism was an
abiding faith in nature or God as a stable and foundational source of meaning and
value."). To be rooted in the premodern, however, does not mean a faculty member
is not also part of the modern and postmodern communities. Some might question
the basis on which a faculty member rooted in a premodern past with pretensions of
divine hegemony on a legal issue should even be allowed a hearing in the public
academic square. Two reasons consistent with the mission statement suggest
themselves. First, the dialogic process described in Parts I and II of this article
should temper a faculty member's assertions of absolute answers to each and every
current legal issue-including contractual impossibility. Second, and more
profound, the authoritative Scriptures to which the faculty member subscribes by
adoption of the statement of faith provides the basis of common ground with those
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mission statement, is a form of theology.8 5
If the common law is the tradition of which the faculty of the
Law School is a part, what should be their contribution to
MacIntyre's second question: its practice? Criticism, analysis,
and application stand out as the three perspectively related
aspects of legal scholarship:86 criticism in light of the will of
Almighty God; analysis in terms of the historic tradition of which
they are a part; and suggested applications to existing
situations. These aspects of faculty scholarship can be
diagramed as follows:
in the modern and postmodern traditions: "[Tihe non-Christian may have, and often
does have a brilliant mind. It may act efficiently .... We may greatly admire such a
mind for what, in spite of its basic principle and because of the fact that God has
released its powers in his restraining grace, it has done." CORNELIUS VAN TIL, THE
DEFENSE OF THE FAITH 298 (1st ed. 1955).
We must still acknowledge most in the modem and postmodern traditions are
still "poised to interdict the operation of theological premises in the public square."
Patrick McKinley Brennan, Of Marriage and Monks, Community and Dialogue, 48
EMORY L.J. 689, 718 (1999). Nonetheless, as Professor Brennan goes on to point out:
Dialogue... does not require (emergent) agreement .... What dialogue
requires is questions and answers that interlocutors share and thus find
comprehensible. Dialogue does not require answers to which everyone in
the dialogue can agree. Dialogue starts and goes forward through shared
questions and a willingness to live with incomplete and sometimes
inconsistent answers ....
Id.
85 "[ilt may be recognized that modem legal theory itself is secular theology,
and that without theology we shall see very little into the nature of law .... " Frank
S. Alexander, Beyond Positivism: A Theological Perspective, 20 GA. L. REV. 1089,
1134 (1986). Characterization of law as a form of theology does not contradict the
mission statement. The tradition of Christian theology has identified two primary
forms of God's revelation to humanity: general (or natural) revelation and special
revelation. Special revelation for many within the Protestant tradition is limited to
the canonical Scriptures. See, e.g., THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH, supra
note 33, at 601-06. By contrast, general revelation "comes through observing
nature, through seeing God's directing influence in history, and through an inner
sense of God's existence and his laws that he has place inside every person."
GRUDEM, supra note 15, at 122-23. Although general (or natural) revelation does
not appear in propositional form it nonetheless reveals the same God as special
revelation. Within its scope, it is as necessary, authoritative, sufficient, and
perspicuous as biblical revelation. See CORNELIUS VAN TIL, THE PROTESTANT
DOCTRINE OF SCRIPTURE 4-12 (1967). The study of natural revelation-from
chemistry to jurisprudence-is thus theology.
86 For a similar tripartite vision of the goal of legal analysis, see Berman, supra
note 62, at 781 (observing the recent development of neo-thomistic criteria for
"analyzing, interpreting, and applying" legal rules).
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Criticism
Analysis Z Application
Figure 2: Scholarship
Paradigm
The last of these perspectives on legal scholarship can take
the form of suggested corrections to the way in which certain
issues are currently addressed or possible approaches to newly
developing states of affairs.
Finally, what are the internal goods advanced by the
practices of criticism, analysis, and application within the
common law? The concept of internal goods within a social
practice8 7 distinct from external goods is barely tenable today.
The difference between internal and external goods is closely
related to an underlying distinction between acknowledging
people as ends or merely as means. MacIntyre describes this
distinction as follows:
To treat someone else as an end is to offer them what I take to
be good reasons for acting in one way rather than another, but
to leave it to them to evaluate those reasons.... It is to appeal
to impersonal criteria of the validity of which each rational
agent must be his or her own judge. By contrast, to treat
someone else as a means is to seek to make him or her an
instrument of my purposes by adducing whatever influences or
considerations will in fact be effective in this or that occasion.88
It is this distinction that has disappeared from practice
within the common law tradition among many legal scholars
today. Contemporary scholars, judges, and students seem
disinclined to see an appeal to objective extra-personal criteria
87 See supra text accompanying note 64 (defining the term practice).
88 MACINTYRE, supra note 17, at 22-23.
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as constitutive of the practice of the common law tradition. 89
The modern tendency sees practice within the common law
tradition as an exercise of power, simply another means by
which to implement various social policy goals. "After Holmes,
the law was a tool for social engineering, and the bench and bar
constituted the primary social engineers. This meant that the
engineers, the lawyers, were important for their role in shaping
the ends and in directing society toward them."90
MacIntyre again points out that this modern managerial
approach to the law cannot help but treat persons as means
rather than ends because "[b]ureaucratic rationality is the
rationality of matching ends to means economically and
efficiently."91 The question of the particular "ends" to which the
means are to be matched is one of values. And reason alone is of
no help with respect to which values the modern inheritors of the
common law tradition should implement because they
passionately believe that conflicts between rival value
claims cannot be rationally settled; values are simply chosen.
If there is no transcendent referent against which our
autonomously chosen values can be measured, then "no type
of authority can appeal to rational criteria to vindicate itself
except that type of bureaucratic authority that appeals precisely
to its own effectiveness. And what this appeal reveals is
that bureaucratic authority is nothing other than successful
power."92
89 By way of contrast, for many previous centuries, the actors in the Western
legal tradition were careful to ascribe their actions in relation to "a systematic,
objective, verifiable body of knowledge, a meta-law by which the legal system itself
may be analyzed and evaluated." Berman & Reid, supra note 54, at 441.
90 Michael P. Schutt, Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Decline of the American
Lawyer: Social Engineering, Religion, and the Search for Professional Identity, 30
RUT. L.J. 143, 158-59 (1998) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Schutt goes on
to make the interesting claim that much lawyer professional dissatisfaction arises
from their inherent instrumentalist view of their client, other parties, opposing
counsel, and the courts: "[Als twentieth-century lawyers struggled with their
identities as professionals, the Holmesian solutions first destroyed lawyers'
distinctiveness as professionals, and then hindered their personal fulfillment by
robbing the work itself of any intrinsic worth." Id. at 180-81 (footnote omitted); see
also Dennis W. Hiebert, The McDonaldization of Protestant Organizations, 29
CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR's REV. 261 (1999) (discussing the effects of bureaucratic
rationalization in other previously teleologically oriented practices such as
Christian missions).
91 MACINTYRE, supra note 17, at 24.
92 Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
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Law as the exercise of power in the service of the ends of
whomever employs it is fundamentally inconsistent with the
aspirations of the mission statement. The reference in the
mission statement to the will of God undercuts an
instrumentalist view of the law. There are criteria by which the
ends of the faculty member of the Law School are to be judged.93
A synopsis of those criteria-the internal goods of the common
law tradition-can be found in the familiar words of the prophet
Micah: "He has told you, 0 man, what is good; and what does the
Lord require of you but to do justice, to love kindness, and to
walk humbly with your God?"94
II. A MULTIPERSPECTIVAL APPROACH TO THE LAW
Parts L.A and I.B of this article claimed that biblical
interpretation is a dialogic activity that takes place from within
three perspectives: the normative (the revelation of God), the
historical (the Catholic tradition), and the existential (the
present community within which the interpreter lives). Then,
Part I.C suggested that this dialogic model could apply equally
well to legal scholars implementing the mission of the Law
School. This Part will further describe the biblical basis for a
multiperspectival approach to continuing the common law
tradition and will illustrate its paradigmatic form.
A. The Biblical Basis
The reply of the prophet Micah to the people's response to
God's summons and complaint 95  quoted above already
93 The existence of "ends" toward which the faculty should strive (and not
merely standards by which they can be evaluated) is implicit in the forward-looking
aspects of the mission statement. A teleological criterion is crucial to a full-orbed
implementation of the mission: "[Ilt makes possible productive moral discourse...
[and] reinforces the dynamic, dialogic character of law as part of human existence."
Alexander, supra note 85, at 1113; see also THE WESTMINSTER SHORTER CATECHISM
(1647), reprinted in 3 SCHAFF, supra note 33, at 676 (stressing the teleological
emphasis in the first question and answer: "What is the chief end of man? Answer.
Man's chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him forever").
94 Micah 6:8.
95 The first eight verses of the sixth chapter of the book of Micah follow the
typical n-1 (rib) format with a summons from the Lord to Israel, see Micah 6:1-2,
God's complaint against his people, see Micah 6:3-5, the people's answer, see Micah
6:6-7, and the prophet's rejoinder, see Micah 6:8. Sentencing is deferred to the end
of the chapter, see Micah 6:13-16. See generally JUAN I. ALFARO, JUSTICE AND
LOYALTY: MICAH 64-66 (1989).
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exemplifies a multiperspectival approach. The range of the
prophet's rejoinder is far reaching and may well extend to
matters outside the limited modern jurisdiction of the law.96 At
the outset, it is clear that the term used for "justice" (mn,
migpat) expressly denotes matters of direct legal concern.97 Yet,
the prophet understood that mi~pat required more than bare
adherence to established legal standards; it also "implie[d] a
commitment and a responsibility for the defense of the poor and
the powerless"98 consistent with the law. Thus, reference to the
normative perspective in connection with modern legal questions
seems well established biblically. But the other elements of the
prophet's reply are also relevant to justifying a multiperspectival
approach to understanding the law and implementing the
normative, historical, and existential aspects of the mission of
the Law School.
The direction to love kindness (-io, hesed) brings .the
historical (covenantal) aspect of Jewish law into the
foreground.99 The Hebrew Scriptures do not understand hesed
as a free-standing concept. Mercy or kindness'00 operated in an
historical context that began with God's gracious covenanting
with the people of Israel at Sinai,1 1 and continued through
subsequent years until the time of the ministry of the prophet
96 The range of human life over which the law has jurisdiction is another one of
the goods over which debate in the common law tradition continues to range. For a
restrictive view of law's empire, see Craig A. Stern, Crime, Moral Luck, and the
Sermon on the Mount, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 801 (1999).
97 "Although mi~pat encompasses a variety of meanings, it has decided judicial
connotations. What is most often the topic of concern is the process governing the
settling of some dispute, whether between human parties or between God and the
Israelites, or the actual verdict itself." 2 NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF OLD
TESTAMENT THEOLOGY AND EXEGESIS 1142 (Willem A. VanGemeren ed., 1997)
[hereinafter NIDOTTEI.
98 ALFARO, supra note 95, at 69.
99 Professor Katherine Doob Sakenfeld convincingly argues that the Scriptural
use of hesed must be understood in the context of the overarching concept of
covenant. See generally KATHERINE DOOB SAKENFELD, THE MEANING OF HESED IN
THE HEBREW BLBLE [sic]: A NEW INQUIRY (1978).
100 Hesed is "notoriously difficult to translate." See generally KATHERINE DOOB
SAKENFELD, FAITHFULNESS IN ACTION: LOYALTY IN BIBLICAL PERSPECTIVE 2-4
(1985).
101 Usage of the term hesed in the Hebrew Scriptures occurs prior to the record
of the description of the initiation of the Sinaitic covenant in Exodus 20. Yet the
bulk of its occurrences are found in later Scriptures, predominantly in the Psalms,
and its covenatal relationship is well accepted. See generally SAXENFELD, supra
note 99.
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Micah and beyond.10 2 There was a Hebrew tradition of hesed,
focusing primarily on God's dealings with his people, in which
the prophet would have understood its historical development
and application. 10 3 A few prophets, including Micah, extended
the tradition of hesed when they applied it to the obligations of
God's people to each other.10 4 There is thus a biblical basis for
employing the perspective of tradition (or history) when
approaching contemporary legal issues.
The prophet also brings the existential perspective of the
present-day community to bear with the reply that the people of
Israel and Judah are "to walk humbly with your God" (,'i5 D
nm m , hasnea' leket 'im-'eloheyka). The Hebrew root of the
infinitive construct translated "walk" (*,', hik) is the word most
frequently used in the Hebrew Scriptures to describe the act or
process of living.0 5 This phrase emphasizes the perspective of
the current situation. It cannot, however, be collapsed into a
species of "situational ethics."10 6 Not only is the existential only
one of the three correlative perspectives addressed by the
prophet, other uses of hik "refer to life lived in obedience or
disobedience.., with reference to covenant standards." 10 7
Encouragement of autonomous individual human potential alone
is an insufficient basis upon which to justify a legal rule.
Reference to the grounds and history of that potential must also
be incorporated into a perspectival analysis of the law.
102 Micah's ministry generally took place in the middle of the eighth century
B.C., prior to the fall of Samaria in 722 B.C. See generally R. DILLARD & T.
LONGMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE OLD TESTAMENT 398-99 (1994).
103 See, e.g., Psalm 89:2[3], 281291, 33[34].
104 It has been observed that
hesed also comes to feature in statements of the moral and ethical
demands that God lays upon Israel. The charge against the northern
Israelites in Hos 4:1 is that there is no faithfulness or love in the land,
while, according to 6:6, God puts a higher premium on hesed than on
sacrifice. Similarly, to love loyalty in human affairs is part of the duty that
God lays upon his people (Mic 6:8).
2 NIDOTTE, supra note 97, at 213; see also Alexander, supra note 85, at 1131 ("The
covenant tradition points to the existence of responsibility for our actions and
stands as a call for the greatest degree of human responsibility in all
relationships.").
105 See 1 NIDOTTE, supra note 97, at 1032-33.
106 JOSEPH FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS: THE NEW MORALITY 43 (1966) ("In
our attempt to be situational... we can pin another label on our method. It is
relativistic.").
107 1 NIDOTTE, supra note 97, at 1033.
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B. The Perspectival Paradigm
Knowledge of any relevant divine transcendent norms is
necessary to carry out a faculty member's task of criticism,
analysis, and application within the common law tradition. The
various covenant arrangements by which God has related to the
created order provide the normative structures in terms of which
a legal scholar should seek to implement the mission of the Law
School. The faculty member's understanding of those norms is
subject to the qualifications described in Parts L.A and I.B of this
article. Discernment of those norms nonetheless is one of the
means consistent with the mission statement by which the
internal goods of the common law can be advanced.
The faculty member can begin to comprehend those norms
through three strands of biblical analysis: exegesis, biblical
theology, and systematic theology. Exegetical theology focuses
on the particular text(s) of Scripture. 08  The text under
consideration may range from a single verse to a paragraph,
book, or even the Scriptures in their entirety. What makes
exegesis distinct is that the person undertaking it "must go
through the text word by word or phrase by phrase, seeking the
meaning of each sentence in its context."10 9  Exegesis
concentrates on the literary characteristics of the document and
seeks to understand the text in light of the intention of the
author and its meaning to the original audience." 0
The term "biblical theology" may seem either pretentious or
redundant. In fact, the term has a technical meaning: "that
branch of theological inquiry concerned with tracing themes
through the diverse sections of the Bible ... and then with
seeking the unifying themes that draw the Bible together.""'
Biblical theology is synchronic in that it seeks to discern
Scriptural themes across the historical record of the
108 Exegesis is a "critical interpretation of Scripture... that has adequate
justification-lexical, grammatical, cultural, theological, historical, geographical, or
other justification." CARSON, supra note 31, at 16.
109 FRAME, supra note 17, at 206.
110 "Traditional exegesis viewed biblical interpretation as consisting of two
major dimensions: the grammatical and the historical." SIDNEY GREIDANUS, THE
MODERN PREACHER AND THE ANCIENT TEXT: INTERPRETING AND PREACHING
BIBLICAL LITERATURE 49 (1988). Richard Pratt emphasizes the nature of Scripture
as literature and exegeting in light of its contemporary rhetorical and literary
standards. See PRATT, supra note 19, at 129-276.
M OSBORNE, supra note 35, at 263.
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Scriptures. 112 It identifies elements of historical continuity as
well as discontinuity over the witness of the canon. The results
of exegetical theology are the building blocks of biblical
theology.113 But the relationship between exegesis and biblical
theology is not a one-way street. Not only is the product of
exegesis the basic unit of biblical theology, but the historically
identified scriptural themes also provide a context for exegesis.
Biblical theology "provides the categories and overall scriptural
unity behind one's interpretation of individual passages, while
exegesis provides the data collated into a biblical theology." 1 4
If exegetical theology focuses on the individual trees of the
canon of Scripture, and if biblical theology focuses on growth
from seedling to full-grown plant, then systematic theology" 5 (or
dogmatics) focuses on the mature forest. The interpreter seeks
to collate all the exegetical results with respect to a particular
topic,116 and brings to bear a choice and arrangement of topics
concerning the canonical data on a diachronic basis: "Biblical
theology studies the individual themes behind the individual
books and traditions within the Bible, seeking covering laws that
integrate them into a holistic pattern. Systematic theology then
contextualizes these into a logical and conceptual whole that
reconstructs dogma for the modern period.""
7
The topics employed, as well as their arrangement in
systematic theology, are manifold." 8 The strength of systematic
112 See FRAME, supra note 17, at 207 ("Biblical theology studies the history of
God's dealings with creation.... It is sometimes called 'the history of
redemption'.....).
11 See OSBORNE, supra note 35, at 265 ("The exegete studies the author's
meaning on the basis of literary considerations (grammar and thought-
development) and historical background (socioeconomic), then the biblical
theologian works with the results and compiles patterns of unity behind the
individual statements.").
114 Id.
115 In certain church traditions, the term "dogmatics" is substantially
equivalent to systematic theology. See FRAME, supra note 17, at 311 ("Dogmatics is
a synonym for systematic theology. In many contexts, the two terms are
interchangeable.").
116 "While exegetical theology focuses on specific passages and biblical theology
focuses on the historical features of Scripture, systematic theology seeks to bring all
the aspects of Scripture together, to synthesize them." Id. at 212; see also GRUDEM,
supra note 15, at 21 ("[Slystematic theology involves collecting and understanding
all the relevant passages in the Bible on various topics and then summarizing their
teachings clearly so that we know what to believe about each topic.").
117 OSBORNE, supra note 35, at 267.
118 Historically, with minor variations, reformed protestant scholastic
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theology is its breadth and logical organization. It runs the
danger, however, of de-historicizing developments within its
identified set of topics over the course of the canon and ignoring
those parts of the Scriptures that do not lend themselves to
analytical reformulation, such as poetry and wisdom
literature.11 9 A question concerning the justification of the legal
doctrine of excuse on account of impossibility represents the type
of issue for which systematic theology is well suited. After
exegeting any relevant biblical texts and placing them in their
respective redemptive-historical contexts, faculty members must
derive a rule (or doctrine) in dialogue with this legal issue. 120
Exegetical
Theology
Biblical Systematic
Theology Theology
Figure 3: Theological
Paradigm
Appropriation of the historic responses of the interpretive
communities, both legal and theological, is the next step by
which the ends of the common law tradition may be realized.
theologians have identified seven loci under which to arrange the data of Scripture:
doctrine of God (theology proper), doctrine of man (theological anthropology),
doctrine of Christ (christology), doctrine of the Holy Spirit (pneumatology), doctrine
of redemption (soteriology), doctrine of the church (ecclesiology), and doctrine of the
future (eschatology). See, e.g., BERKHOF, supra note 49; GRUDEM, supra note 15; 1
CHARLES HODGE, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY (1887); FRANCIS TURRETIN, INSTITUTES
OF ELENCTIC THEOLOGY (James T. Dennison, Jr. ed. & George Musgrave Giger
trans., 1992) (1696).
119 Compare the obvious emotional anguish described in Psalm 22:112 and
22:2[3] with the scholastic treatment of the same passage with respect to the
doctrine of the covenant of redemption in BERKHOF, supra note 49, at 266-67
("[Tihere are passages in which the Messiah speaks of God as His God, thus using
covenant language, namely, [Psalms 22:1, 22:2] .... ").
120 The frequently expressed prejudice against systematic or dogmatic theology
is greatly misplaced: "Systematics is really a wide-open discipline. There are so
many tasks waiting to be done, so many questions being asked today that have
never been dealt with seriously by orthodox systematic theologians .... " FRAME,
supra note 17, at 213.
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The authority of an interpreter's historical tradition is
inescapable. 121 But the use of tradition122 can also be justified on
a normative basis. Not only do the Scriptures explicitly or
implicitly justify certain beliefs, but they also "command] us to
use all diligence to discover the truth and to live by it."123 The
Hebrew Scriptures mandate the use of empirical data when
rendering judicial decisions. 2 4 The Hebrew Scriptures also
exemplify the use of non-canonical wisdom by their adaptation of
portions of the Egyptian Instruction of Amenemopet into what
became the canonical book of Proverbs. 125  The uniquely
authoritative Scriptures, belief in which the faculty member is
required to assent, thus warrant the use of the historical
responses by his or her predecessors in the common law
tradition. 126
The principal differences between the perspectives of the
normative and the historical (or traditional) are their objects.
The normative perspective focuses on the role of Scripture,
whereas the historical perspective focuses on human culture;
and the normative perspective focuses on law (imperative),
whereas the historical perspective focuses on facts (indicative).127
A secondary difference between the normative and traditional
perspectives concerns their methods. The tools of elucidating the
normative claims of Scripture were described above as exegesis,
biblical theology, and systematic theology. The analytical tool of
historym28 is the primary means of discerning what earlier
121 See supra text accompanying notes 24-35.
122 "Tradition" is only one aspect of historical knowledge, albeit one of the most
important for the legal scholar. See supra note 39; supra text accompanying note 62.
For other examples of normatively justified sources of knowledge, see infra note 132
and text accompanying notes 134-35.
123 FRAME, supra note 17, at 128.
124 See, e.g., Deuteronomy 17:6; 19:15. The New Testament Scriptures also
justify the use of non-scriptural data in the process of applying canonical truth to
particular states of affairs. See, e.g., 1 John 4:1; Matthew 18:16 (quoting
Deuteronomy 19:15); 1 Thessalonians 5:21; 1 Timothy 5:19.
125 The scholarly consensus has concluded that the "sayings of the wise,"
Proverbs 22:17-24:34, integrated the earlier Egyptian source into Proverbs. See,
e.g., DILLARD & LONGMAN, supra note 102, at 240-41; D. KIDNER, THE WISDOM OF
PROVERBS, JOB, AND ECCLESIASTES 44-45 (1985).
126 See supra text accompanying note 84 (providing a general discussion of the
concept of general (or natural) revelation).
127 See generally FRAME, supra note 17, at 140.
128 "History" is an ambiguous term. It can refer to events in the past as well as
to a record or interpretation of the past. See R. NASH, CHRISTIAN FAITH AND
HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 12-13 (1984).
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students of the law or theology have said or done with respect to
a particular issue.129 History should be more than a simple
chronicle of past events; it should aim to provide an intelligible
narrative of the past that has meaning today.130 In order for any
sort of meaningful dialogue to occur, those who seek to criticize,
analyze, and apply must know what has been said about a topic
such as contractual impossibility so they can understand what
our contemporary words and practices mean. The results of
meaningful historical research also have a normative function
because that perspective
rests on the premise that certain long term historical
experiences of a people lead it in certain directions and, with
respect to law that the past times through which the legal
institutions of a people have developed help to determine the
standards according to which its laws should be enacted andinterpreted .... 131
Much of the resources for the historian's work is made up of
written records that can be used as a primary resource.132 To
analyze the legal activities of societies where no written
proceedings exist, the tools of cultural anthropology and
archeology must be used.133 Each of these three disciplines can
129 See FRAME, supra note 17, at 302-05.
130 "[History is] the attempt to reconstruct in a significant narrative the
important events of the human past through a study of the relevant data available
in the historian's own present experience." NASH, supra note 128, at 14; see also
Berman, supra note 62, at 800 ("When we say 'history' we mean something more
than chronology. We mean not merely change but patterns of change, implying
direction in time, which in turn implies either purpose or fate.").
131 Berman, supra note 62, at 795 (emphasis added). Professor Berman's high
regard for history is not inconsistent with either the mission statement or the
Statement of Faith if the faculty member takes seriously the Scriptural doctrine of
providence. See, e.g., UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, supra note 14, at 80
("The witness of Scripture is unanimous that the solicitude of divine providence is
concrete and immediate; God cares for all, from the least things to the great events
of the world and its history. The sacred books powerfully affirm God's absolute
sovereignty over the course of events."); THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH,
supra note 33, ch. 5.1, at 612 ("God the great Creator of all things doth uphold,
direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions, and things ....").
132 "Aside from direct knowledge of an event by an eyewitness, or a firsthand
investigation on the scene through interviews, laboratory or fieldwork, or the study
of relics, the shortest path to the facts is library research." JAQUES BARzuN &
HENRY F. GRAFF, THE MODERN RESEARCHER 61-62 (4th ed. 1985).
133 For an example of the usefulness of archeological studies in the law, see
Diana M. Liverman, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Drought in Mexico, 39 NATL
RESOURCES J. 99 (1999) (discussing forms of past and present responses to drought
in northern Mexico); see also Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
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elucidate the responses of various human traditions to a
contemporary legal issue. The relationship among these tools for
the perspective of the historical can be diagramed as follows:
History
Cultural
Anthropology Archeology
Figure 4: Historical
Paradigm
The perspective of the current community (or existential
perspective) is the third viewpoint from which a faculty member
must consider contemporary legal issues. The faculty member
must take into account the "felt needs" of the times and the
current responses of the community of legal scholars (lawyers,
academics, and judges) to those needs in their service of
criticism, analysis, and application. The current community,
however, represents more than what other legal scholars say
about a legal issue. It includes the results of all forms of
analysis, except the normative perspective of theology and the
traditional perspective disclosed in history and its cognates. The
tools of analyzing the current state of affairs include the various
sciences, such as economics, psychology, and sociology,'34 as well
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
3001-3013 (1994)). The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act is
an example of legislation by which Congress attempted to resolve the conflict
between the interests of archeology and anthropology on the one hand, and the
current manifestation of the Native American historical tradition on the other. For
an interesting recollection of the relationship of anthropology and the Uniform
Commercial Code, see K LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY:
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941) (discussing the use
of anthropological studies of the Cheyenne in the 1930s and subsequent utilization
of arguably empirical studies of business practices in drafting Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code).
134 The recently self-identified approach of socio-economics has attempted to
bridge the gap between neoclassical law and economics and other social science
perspectives on human behavior. See, e.g., Robert Ashford, Socio-Economics: What is
its Place in Law Practice?, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 611 (offering an overview of socio-
economics).
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as philosophy, logic, 135 and language and literary studies. 36 The
Scriptural references noted above in connection with the
perspective of tradition 137 equally justify the use of data drawn
from current studies by a faculty member seeking to fulfill the
mission of the Law School. An approach to the existential
perspective of the faculty's task can be diagramed as follows:
Logic, and
Language/LiteraryStudiies
Sociology
and
Psychology Economics
Figutre 5: Existential
Paradigm
135 Some might question placing logic among the tools of existential rather than
with the means of analysis of the normative. To do so would violate the statement of
the nature and extent of biblical authority described earlier. See supra note 14. It is
the Scriptures which justify logic, not vice versa:
Logic is a law of thought.., but as such is subordinate to Scripture .... It
is Scripture that warrants our use of logic, not the other way around ....
[Llogic is in a position similar to linguistics and history-a discipline
that.., ought... to govern our thinking about Scripture but information
that itself is subject to biblical criteria.
FRAME, supra note 17, at 243.
136 See FRAME, supra note 17, at 215-318. Examples of the use of literary
theory in analyzing the law are substantial. See, e.g., Jonathan Boyarin, The Legacy
of Lochner: Law, Literature, and the Resurrection of Contract, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
195 (1999) (providing an extended review essay covering three books dealing with
late nineteenth century contract jurisprudence from the perspectives of traditional
legal analysis, philosophy, and literature); Barbara A. Fure, Contracts As Literature:
A Hermeneutic Approach to the Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in
Commercial Loan Agreements, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 729 (1993) (arguing that judicial
imposition of the doctrine of the duty of implied good faith is misguided and that
courts should work harder to discover the parties' intent by using all relevant
evidence, including that which is outside the "four corners" of the contract).
137 See supra text accompanying notes 121-32.
MISSION POSSIBLE
III. CONTRACTUAL IMPOSSIBILITY: GLANCES AT THE
PERSPECTIVES
Legal scholars would acknowledge the venerable history of
the doctrine of impossibility as well as the existence of a modest
current debate on the topic. 38 Some, however, even from within
the Christian tradition, would question whether there are any
non-trivial norms revealed in the Hebrew or Christian
Scriptures relevant to contractual impossibility. If this point of
view is correct, how can a faculty member at the Law School
actually begin to implement the multiperspectival approach to
legal analysis portrayed in Part II of this article?
The identification of normative standards relevant to
contractual impossibility is not as bleak as might first appear.
Operating consistently with the mission of the Law School, a
faculty member could seek first to justify the use of contracts as
a form of social activity by reference to the promise-keeping
character of the God revealed in the Scriptures, and then move
on to analyze the significance of humanity's creation in the
image of God, the persistent use of the ancient Near Eastern
practice of covenanting as the model of God's relationship with
humanity,139 and the approbation of promise-keeping in the
torah, poetry, and the Wisdom literature of the Hebrew
Scriptures. The faculty member could then analyze the
significance of those relatively rare occasions in which a biblical
character receives tacit approval for breaching a promise140 and
particularly those instances when God does not carry out a
threatened judgment due to an intervening contingency
operating as an implicit condition.' 4'
The traditional or historical perspective on contractual
impossibility could start with the Roman law and progress
through the medieval and early modern period. 142 Attention
138 See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
494-537 (4th ed. 1998); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 637-67 (3d ed. 1999);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 115-21 (5th ed. 1998); see also
infra notes 144 and 150.
139 See generally K.A. KITCHEN, ANCIENT ORIENT AND OLD TESTAMENT 90-102
(1966); MEREDITH G. KLINE, BY OATH CONSIGNED 13-38 (1968).
140 See, e.g., 1 Samuel 25:9.
141 See, e.g., 1 Kings 21:17.
142 Talmudic and Islamic sources may also be helpful. See, e.g., Edward L.
Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be: An Economic
Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41 J.L. & ECON. 1, 23 (1998).
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should be given to original archival research from a range of
sources-theological, historical, and legal.143  This historical
perusal must not be an end for itself. Instead, it should form
part of the intellectual collage by which the faculty member can
contribute to the goods of the common law tradition: criticism,
analysis, and application.144
Finally, the insights of current neoclassical economic
analyses of the law145 and their more sociologically nuanced
contemporaries 146 must be considered. The issue of contractual
impossibility should be considered in light of the views of those
who seek to justify contract law as either an exercise of
individual autonomy 147 or as an extension of the right of
property. 148 The broad relational approach to contract law149 as
well as the specific polyvalent approach to legal conundrums
articulated by feminist legal scholars can also provide a fruitful
platform of analysis. 150 No insight into the state of affairs
143 This is certainly not to denigrate use of secondary sources. There are several
excellent secondary sources that address the historical development of contract law
in general and give some attention to impossibility in particular. See, e.g., BERMAN,
supra note 50; JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1991); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF
CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT (1975). Consideration of
"archeological" resources such as records of judicial and non-judicial dispute
resolution mechanisms from the earliest times available should also be considered.
144 For an example of what an analysis of a doctrine similar to contractual
impossibility from the historical perspective might look like, see Val D. Ricks,
American Mutual Mistake: Half-Civilian Mongrel, Consideration Reincarnate, 58
LA. L. REV. 663 (1998). For an analysis of the history of contractual impossibility in
England, see John D. Wladis, Common Law and Uncommon Events: The
Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance in English Contract
Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1575 (1987).
145 See, e.g., Christopher J. Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility
Doctrine, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 (1982); Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield,
Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
146 See supra text accompanying note 134.
147 See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981).
148 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE
RULE OF LAW (1998); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 269 (1986); Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of
Legal Philosophy, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1223 (1984) (reviewing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS (1982)).
149 See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO
MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980).
150 See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern
Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1992) (criticizing the
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denominated as contractual impossibility from the current
community of legal scholars can be rejected out of hand.151
Conversely, no faculty member acting consistently with the
mission statement can allow such a contemporary analysis of
impossibility to trump any normative claims of the Scriptures on
the topic. 152
CONCLUSION
The references in Part III of this article exemplify how a
faculty member at the Law School could implement at least two
of the aspirations of the mission statement. Through the FLIC
Report, the University has outlined several approaches to the
integration of the Christian faith and academic study. The
Institutes Focus explicitly brings the Scriptures and tradition to
bear on legal topics. This article seeks both to justify and
describe a more detailed model by which this insight of the FLIC
Report can be used to implement the mission statement. Of
course, whether a multiperspectival approach to contractual
impossibility will actually produce a result furthering that
mission remains to be seen: "wisdom is justified by her
children."153 Nonetheless, the Scriptural and analytic bases
argued above establish sufficient grounds to pursue this avenue.
single-minded classical law and economics approach from the vantage point of the
virtue of considering an issue in terms of multiple, relational values).
151 For a comparable assertion in the narrower context of theology, see FRAME,
supra note 17, at 314 ("[A]ll sciences help us to apply and therefore to interpret
Scripture.").
152 See supra note 12 for the Statement of Faith required of all faculty members
at the Law School; see also FRAME, supra note 17, at 316; supra text accompanying
notes 14-17. "[If, after reflection, I determine that my original interpretation of
Scripture [including Scriptural norms relating to contractual impossibility, if any]
was correct and that still conflicts with the apparent results of [contemporary legal
analysis], then I must follow Scripture." FRAME, supra note 17, at 316.
153 Matthew 11:19.
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